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The objective of this paper is to analyze the consequences of including environment of players in 
the Cournot-Nash competition. A two-persons non-cooperative game is considered. The 
environment is expressed in terms of “others". The function of the environment is to maintain its 
equilibrium. The equilibrium point of the environment is upgraded if the strategies of one or both 
players have a favorable impact on the environment. The equilibrium stays at its previous level 
otherwise. The equilibrium point of the environment is called an environmental attractor. The 
environmental attractor affects the strategies of the players which in turn define the reaction 
functions and the pay-off functions. It is shown that in the presence of an environmental attractor, 
players cannot reach a Nash point. In fact the reaction functions of the players act as orbits around 
the environmental attractor. Thus each player has a finite but compact number of strategies 
compatible with the environment available to them. As long as the equilibrium of the environment 
is maintained, any of the orbits will be acceptable choices for the players. An environmental 
model of a two-persons competition game is given, and the consequences are studied. 
JEL: C72. 
Key words: Competition; strategy; environment; environmental vectors; environmental 
attractors; orbits; reaction functions; payoff functions; player-environment interaction. 
 
1 Introduction 
The objective of this paper is to explore the idea that in any strategic game, players act within an 
environment and this environment can play a role in the outcome of the competition. The 
environment is expressed in terms of “others". The interaction of the environment with the players 
is analyzed and its' consequences in terms of finding an equilibrium point is studied. In all 
strategic competition models it is assumed that the players compete in a void. They take up 
strategies with respect to the strategies of other player(s). Neither of the players considers the 
impact of the environment on their strategies and the fact that the environment modifies the nature 
of each strategy. It is also assumed that the environment does not alter the outcome of the Nash 
type competition. In general the environment has one objective and that is to maintain 
equilibrium. The environment either rejects the strategies of both players, in which case it 
maintains its previous equilibrium and forces players to modify their strategies around the 
environmental equilibrium point, or it adopts the strategy of one of the players and in this case it 
updates its equilibrium point. The player whose strategy is accepted by the environment is better 
off. The other player has to either modify his strategy around the new equilibrium point or 
otherwise take the consequences of going on independently of the environment. Once one takes 
into account the environment of the players the concept of a Nash equilibrium point becomes 
obsolete. There is no winner-winner situation. In this case there will always be a player who will 
be better off than the other. How much a player is better off depends on how close the player's 
strategy is with respect to the choice of the environment. This is demonstrated in the following 
example. In order to clamber up the career ladder, some people slave nights and week-ends at the 
office. They gain a rank at the expense of their free time. But in doing so they hurt anyone else 
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who aspires to the same goal. They too will have to give up their week-ends to keep up. In this 
case the strategy of one player has a direct impact on the environment. By his aspirations he has 
changed the equilibrium of his environment. The person with high aspirations in this example 
wins the game ignoring the effect of his actions on his immediate environment, his office. Though 
the high achiever in this example wins the competition and obtains a rank, his actions have altered 
his environment. His environment has accepted the new equilibrium. This new equilibrium is 
working longer and harder which is translated into a higher pay-off. If others follow suite and 
work as hard or somewhat hard they stand to gain just as our high achiever has. But if others 
choose to go on with their routine they forego the rewards which are higher pay-offs. 
     An environment can be either an economic environment, or a social environment summed up 
as “others", or a natural (physical) environment. In this paper only social environment is 
considered. To model the environment into a strategic game, the following attributes of the 
environment are recognized and used. Environment is impartial to both players. Environment 
does not choose strategies with respect to any of the players. Environment has one criterion, it's 
aim is to stay at equilibrium. If its equilibrium is disturbed it will do one of two things. If the 
change is unfavorable for environment, then environment will attempt to go back to the previous 
equilibrium level. If change is favorable for environment, then environment accepts this change 
and upgrades the previous equilibrium to a new one. Since environment automatically reverts to 
its previous state of equilibrium or upgrades the existing equilibrium, it affects the outcome of any 
strategic game by eliminating the player's equilibrium point, and choosing one player over the 
other as the winner of the competition. 
2 Modeling of strategic games within an environment 
For the purpose of modeling some assumptions are made. A two-persons non cooperative 
strategic game is considered. The game has several features. First, the game has rules that govern 
the order in which actions are taken, describe the array of allowed actions, and define how the 
outcome of the game is related to the actions taken. Second there are two players, each of whom 
is struggling consciously to do the best he can for himself. The outcome of a player depends on 
the actions of the other player. The player knows this, and knows that choosing the best action 
requires making an intelligent assessment of the actions likely to be taken by the other player. 
Each player possesses a complete information. Each player knows who the other player is, and all 
actions available to players, and all potential outcomes to both players. The joint actions of the 
two players determine each player's pay-off, [1],[2]. Players know that their actions alter the 
equilibrium of their environment. They know that this alteration is either positive or negative; and 
that the environment will react to change. They also know that their standing in the game either 
strengthens or weakens their chances of winning according to whether the environment is affected 
favorably or unfavorably. 
       Third, these players are in an environment which is affected by their game. The environment 
does not compete, it reacts. It is assumed that the environment is at equilibrium at the beginning 
of a game. This equilibrium is upgraded as a function of each player's strategy. The environment 
upgrades to a new equilibrium if the strategy of one of the players is favorable. The position of the 
player whose strategy created this new equilibrium is re-enforced in the game and the other player 
is now aware of this fact. The other player has to choose a strategy that is the best strategy with 
respect to the other player and the new environmental equilibrium point. If however the change is 
unfavorable, then the environment rejects the change and stays at the previous equilibrium level. 
The position of the player whose strategy created this negative change is weakened; the other 
player is aware of this. At this point the strong player has no incentive to change his strategy. To 
react to the other player he modifies his strategy very slightly pivoting around the new 
environmental equilibrium. The weaker player has two options. He accepts the new 
environmental equilibrium point and he picks a strategy with minimum standard deviation. Or he 
continues with the strategy independent of the environment hoping that this way he will incite the 
other player to respond in the same manner. Naturally as long as the strong player is ahead of the 
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game his motivation to change strategy is very low. But it is possible that he gets manipulated by 
the weaker player and responds with a different strategy in return. In this case, if both players 
continue the game ignoring the environment it is possible to reach a Nash point. Then the Nash 
point is unstable and will change as soon as the environment reacts to the game, even if the 
players are not competing anymore. The environment will reverse the outcome of the Nash 
equilibrium since the environment aims at reaching a favorable equilibrium. Both players stand to 
loose in this situation. Eventually they have to readjust their strategies to the environmental 
equilibrium point somewhere along the path of the game. 
          Mathematically speaking, the equilibrium seeking action of the environment acts as an 
environmental attractor of a dynamic system of two-player competition. This environmental 
attractor will modify the behavior of the players. Thus these attractors create a new dynamic that 
affects the player even after the outcome of the game, when in fact the player is not competing 
anymore. How can environmental attractors be modeled is the topic of the next paragraph. 
Quantification of the environment in a two persons game is achieved first by defining every single 
change in the environment as a vector with components being the strategies of the two players; 
and second quantifying the environmental change as the change that is accepted by the majority of 
the environment, in other words “others". In reality for each player two situations can occur: 1) 
each consecutive strategy affects a large number of  “others", 2) each consecutive strategy affects 
a small number of  “others". Strategies that are small variations around the environmental attractor 
affect a smaller number of “others". This gives players a freedom of competing on a level that is 
almost independent of the environment. They can positively modify their pay-offs. Each can try to 
improve his pay-off slightly. This will stabilize the situation of each player. If each consecutive 
strategy of a player is widely different from the environmental attractor, then it impacts a higher 
number of “others". Players are challenged. The environment will react by forcing players to 
modify their respective strategies. Either the environment keeps the present attractor or moves to a 
new one. In both cases players face a new situation where their set of available strategies has to be 
revisited in order to match the force of the environmental attractor. 
       Equilibrium points in a non-cooperative competition are found based on the fixed point 
theory. This means that pay-off functions follow the conditions of the fixed point theory that for 
every strategy space (S), there is a mapping  (P) of (S) such that (S) is projected into itself,          
(P : S  S). There exists a fixed point (s ∈ S ) such that (P(s) = s). An strategy set (S) is a 
compact set in, (ℝ𝑛) [3]. The introduction of the environmental equilibrium point adds 
complications. Complications occur in two directions. One is that the existence of the 
environmental attractor changes the nature of the strategy sets of the players. Second is the change 
in the behavior of the pay-off functions of players towards the environmental attractor. 
Environment eliminates the fixed point due to competition. The actual fixed point is decided by 
the environment. The existence of the environmental attractor changes the nature of the strategy 
sets. These sets will no longer be compact sets. To show this one must return to the general 
definition of compact sets, and the definition of a fixed point space. By definition, compact sets 
have the property that every collection of open sets has a finite sub-collection with the same 
property. A set is a compact set if and only if it is closed and bounded. This property no longer 
holds when an environmental attractor is introduced. The existence of this attractor means that 
many open sets around each set point can be considered as valid sub-sets. These sets will never be 
closed and bounded. This is due to the fact that at any point the environment can upgrade its 
equilibrium meaning that it changes the attractor thus allowing for open sets to overlap. The 
strategy set in the presence of the environmental attractor cannot have a fixed point property since 
it loses its compact property. Given (s) an element of the strategy space (S), no mapping can be 
found that would give (s = P(s)). The second reason is that pay-off functions in the presence of the 
environmental attractor become non-contractive functions. The environmental attractor forces the 
players to choose strategies around it. Thus pay-off functions become orbits of the environmental 
attractor. The idea of pay-off functions as orbits becomes clear later on when mathematical 
formulation of these functions is introduced. 
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                            Figure 10. Payoff functions as orbits around the environmental attractor (0) 
 
     Payoff functions do not intersect at a fixed point. How can an equilibrium point be 
defined, [4],[5],[6],[7]. The most evident answer is that there is no equilibrium point. A 
player adopts an orbit that best fits his objectives and best corresponds to the environmental 
attractor. The other player reacts to this and in his turn adopts an orbit that best responds to 
the environmental attractor and the other player. The orbits of the two players cannot 
intersect and thus prevent any possibility of an equilibrium solution. The non-existence of 
an equilibrium point is not a sign of chaos. Though no equilibrium point can be found, 
there is still many possibilities for the two players to choose among orbits available to them 
and find one that is most optimal for them. 
7 Conclusion 
In this paper a special case of strategic competition is presented. The idea of competition 
within an environment that reacts is new. It presents new aspects of a strategic competition 
that have not been considered up to now. The environmental interference is different from 
cooperative or n-persons games. Environment does not compete. It has one permanent 
objective and that is to preserve the equilibrium of the environment. If this equilibrium is 
disturbed then environment reacts to restore it back to either its previous state or if change 
is perceived as positive for the environment, then it will upgrade the previous state to a new 
state. Environment does not take sides; 
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it adopts a strategy of one of the players if it is an improvement compared to its previous 
state. Though this act re-enforces the position of the player whose strategy is chosen by the 
environment, it does not in any way lead to the player winning the game. Therefore, 
environment does not cooperate or ally itself with any of the players. 
New ideas are introduced in this paper. The environmental attractor represents the impact 
of the environment on the players. Players can not choose strategies to counteract the 
environment. The attractor forces the players to modify their strategies with respect to the 
environmental attractor. The reaction functions of the players behave differently from what 
is assumed in the fixed point theory. The reaction functions become orbits around the 
environmental attractor. This concept is new. Is there an equilibrium point in such a 
circumstance? The answer in this paper is no. There is no equilibrium point in the 
traditional sense. Each player chooses an appropriate orbit that fits best the objectives that 
he pursues given the environmental attractor. 
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